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WEST V. GIBSON1: FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WIN THE BATTLE, BUT ULTIMATELY LOSE 
THE WAR FOR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES UNDER TITLE VII 
 
Whatever the EEOC's original mission, and whatever the original 
hope, today the agency is clearly a failure, serving . . . as little more 
than an administrative obstacle to resolution of claims . . . .2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1991, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991(hereinafter 1991 CRA),3 
which allows victims of intentional employment discrimination to recover compensatory 
and, in some cases, punitive damages.4  However, the 1991 CRA did not clarify 
whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC)5 could  
require the federal government to pay those damages to federal employees who were 
successful in the administrative process.6  This year, in West v. Gibson, the Supreme 
                                                 
1 527 U.S. 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999). 
2 Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency's Role in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 64 (1996). 
3 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071-1100.  The 1991 Act amends five statutes: 1. Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964;  2. the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990;  3. the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967;  4. the Civil Rights Act of 1866; and  5. the Civil 
Rights Attorney's Awards Act of 1976.  E.g., Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 
1991 and EEOC Enforcement, 23 STETSON L. REV. 53, 54 (1993).  The portions of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 at issue in West v. Gibson are codified at 42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)-(d) (1999). 
4 42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (1999).  However, government employees may not recover punitive 
damages from the federal government.  42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(1) (1999).  See infra  notes 14-28 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  
5 The EEOC was created in 1964, under the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, described infra note 14.  E.g., Mary Kathryn Lynch, The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission: Comments on the Agency and its Role in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 20 GA. J. INT 'L & COMP. L. 89, 92 (1987).  Initially, the EEOC had no 
enforcement powers; it could only investigate discrimination claims and encourage voluntary 
conciliation between the parties.  Id. at 93.  Starting in 1972, the EEOC's authority expanded to 
allow it to actually litigate Title VII claims and, subsequently, claims under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Equal Pay Act.  Id. at 94.   
6 Because the language of 42 U.S.C. §1981a, which contains the new damages provisions, is 
not clear on this point, there has been disagreement in two circuits.  E.g., Crawford v. Babbitt, 
148 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated by Babbitt v. Crawford, 119 S. Ct. 2263 (1999); Fitzgerald 
v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 1997).  Crawford and 
Fitzgerald are discussed infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.  The issue of whether the 
EEOC has the power to award these damages is especially critical for federal employees 
because their only cause of action for discrimination lies under Title VII, and because they are 
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Court held that the EEOC can indeed order government agencies to compensate federal 
sector complainants for any physical and emotional injuries they suffer as a result of 
intentional workplace discrimination.7   
 
At first glance, the Court's allocation of broader adjudicatory powers to the 
EEOC seems like an advantageous decision for employment discrimination plaintiffs,8 
especially those in the federal sector who must rely on the EEOC administrative process 
to adjudicate their claims.9  However, upon closer analysis, it is not clear whether 
federal complainants navigating the EEOC system will actually reap the advantages of 
the compensatory damages provisions of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the EEOC's 
newfound ability to award them.10  
 
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in West v. Gibson against the 
backdrop of the new damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the EEOC 
system for federal employees.  Section II provides a brief legislative history of the 1991 
CRA, outlines the EEOC complaint procedure specifically tailored to federal sector 
employees, and describes the cases leading up to West v. Gibson.11  Section III 
                                                                                                                         
obligated to use the EEOC administrative process almost exclusively to address their 
complaints.  Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 832-33 (1976) (“The balance, 
completeness, and structural integrity of § 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner's 
contention that the judicial remedy afforded by § 717(c) was designed merely to supplement 
other putative judicial relief.”).  See infra notes 29-40 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the administrative process for federal employees. 
7 West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906, 1912 (1999).  For an explanation of the EEOC's treatment of 
compensatory damages, see infra notes 100-124 and accompanying text. 
8 In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that severely curtailed 
employment plaintiffs' rights to recover in discrimination suits.  E.g., Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (holding that §1981 applied only to the making of 
employment contracts, not to discriminatory actions that may take place during the 
performance of them).  One of Congress' purposes in enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act was 
to undo the effects of those decisions.  H. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 14 (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552.  See also infra  notes 23-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the damages provisions of the 1991 CRA.  The Supreme Court decisions themselves are 
discussed in more detail infra note 17. 
9 Government employees' claims are processed through a lengthy administrative process 
initially within the offending agency, and subsequently through the EEOC if the complainant 
chooses to appeal the agency decision.  See generally ABIGAIL MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW §§ 9.02-9.05 (3d ed. 1999); see also  infra notes 29-40 and accompanying 
text.  In the federal sector, the EEOC's determinations are binding on the agency unless the 
complainant seeks de novo review in federal court.  Gibson v. Brown, 137 F.3d 992, 993 (7th 
Cir. 1998), vacated sub nom. West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999). 
10 See infra  notes 114-130 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra  notes 14-49 and accompanying text. 
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describes the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gibson,12 and  Section IV analyzes the 
decision, concluding that, given the realities of congressional compromise and systemic 
constraints, the Supreme Court's decision actually does little to benefit federal 
employment discriminatees in the administrative process, at least in terms of allowing 




A.  Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Adding Bite to Title VII's Bark  
 
1.  Brief History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 
 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 in order to 
promote a discrimination-free workplace in both the public and private sectors.15  The 
federal courts' initial liberal construction of Title VII16 eventually gave way, in the late 
                                                 
12 See infra notes 50-94 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra  notes 95-130 and accompanying text. 
14 Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1995).  Title VII protects federal 
sector employees by providing that these employees “shall be made free from any 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(a) 
(1999).  See generally Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, 
Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375 (1995) (examining the efficacy of Title VII over 
the past thirty years, including contemporary use of Title VII and its impact on the labor 
market).  
15 E.g., Michael Roskiewicz, Note, Title VII Remedies: Lifting the Statutory Caps from the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Achieve Equal Remedies for Employment Discrimination, 43 
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 391, 391-92 (1993) (“Title VII protects against discrimination 
based on race, color, sex, or national origin in virtually every aspect of the employment 
relationship.”).  Congress did not extend Title VII to cover federal employees until 1972, when 
it enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 
Stat. 11.   Prior to the enactment of Title VII, workplace discriminatees had to rely on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which is codified at 42 U.S.C. §1981 and which proscribes racial 
discrimination in public and private contractual relationships.  E.g., Caryn Leslie Lilling, Note, 
The Civil Rights Act of 1991: An Examination of the Storm Preceding the Compromise of 
America's Civil Rights, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 215, 247 (1991).  Section 1981 provides, in 
pertinent part, that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the 
same rights in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and 
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is 
enjoyed by white citizens . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §1981 (1999). 
16 Title VII analysis has yielded two theories of discrimination: disparate impact and disparate 
treatment.   E.g., Lilling, supra  note 15, at 222.  Disparate treatment entails treating individuals 
differently based on their race, sex, religion, etc.  Id. at 224.  The Supreme Court fashioned the 
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1980s and early 1990s, to more restrictive views of employees' rights in the 
workplace.17  The Court's striking change in approach at that time, combined with Title 
VII's limited damages provisions,18 seriously threatened Title VII and its goal of 
eliminating workplace discrimination by making it increasingly more difficult for 
employment discriminatees to bring successful claims.19  For this reason, Congress set 
out to counteract these decisions via legislation designed to restore balance to civil 
rights laws.20 After a firestorm of controversy and President Bush's veto of Congress' 
                                                                                                                         
disparate impact theory in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), where it 
unanimously held that Title VII forbids employment practices that have a discriminatory effect 
even if they were adopted without discriminatory intent.  Under Griggs and its progeny, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate that a given employment practice has an adverse impact on job 
applicants; the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the practice in question is 
justified by some business necessity.  Lilling, supra  note 15, at 224.  Then, the employee must 
show that the employer could accomplish the same result using non-discriminatory 
processes.  Id.      
17 One purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to respond to a series of Supreme Court 
decisions that severely curtailed plaintiffs' rights to a discrimination-free workplace, the most 
significant of which are as follows: Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 
(limiting Griggs by holding that an employer must only produce evidence of a business 
justification after a plaintiff demonstrates disparate impact and that the burden of persuasion 
remains with the plaintiff-employee); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) 
(holding that Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination only in the initial formation of a 
contract; Section 1981 does not apply to discriminatory conduct that arises during the 
performance of an employment contract); and Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 
(1989) (holding that, when a plaintiff shows that discriminatory animus motivated an 
employment decision, an employer could avoid liability by showing that it would have made 
the same decision for other, non-discriminatory, reasons).  E.g., Livingston, supra  note 3, at 
54-55. 
18 Prior to the 1991 Act, Title VII permitted only the damages contained in the text of Title VII 
itself: enjoining the respondent-employer from engaging in a discriminatory employment 
practice; reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay; or “any other 
equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.”  42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(1) (1999). 
19 Cf. Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The 
Conflict between the Rhetoric and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 1, 20-30 (1994) (providing an extensive analysis of the legislative history of the 1991 
CRA, including the politics and policies behind it).  When the 1989 decisions came down, see 
supra  note 17, there was much stir among civil rights groups, lobbyists, and members of 
Congress.  Govan, supra  at 23.  For example, Senator Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) 
characterized  these decisions as a “‘stunning example of the Court's retreat from equal 
opportunity.'” Id. at 23-24. 
20 Govan, supra  note 19, at 25, 31.  Immediately after the 1989 Supreme Court term, 
Congressmen Augustus Hawkins and Edward Kennedy led an effort to draft legislation to 
overturn the adverse civil rights decisions.  Id. at 31.  These decisions are listed supra  note 
17.  Another purpose of enacting new legislation was to equalize Title VII and Section 1981 so 
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initial proposal (the Civil Rights Act of 1990),21 the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was signed 
into law on November 21, 1991.22 
 
2.  The Damages Provisions of the 1991 CRA 
 
The 1991 CRA represents the ultimate compromise between Congress and the 
Bush administration.23  Although the Act responded to the Supreme Court's civil rights 
decisions and  expanded remedies for victims of discrimination, it also catered to 
employers' fears of skyrocketing costs of litigation.24  To be eligible for compensatory 
damages, a complainant must be a victim of intentional discrimination25 and he must not 
be able to recover under 42 U.S.C. §1981.26  As part of the compromise, both 
                                                                                                                         
that victims of other types of discrimination would enjoy the same rights and remedies as 
racial discriminatees had under Section 1981.  Govan, supra  note 19, at 36.  Since expanding 
Section 1981 to include other groups was not a desirable outcome, the legislators involved 
sought instead to add compensatory damages, punitive damages, and jury trials to the Title 
VII remedial scheme.  Id. 
21 Lawmakers and commentators who opposed civil rights reform were very critical of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1990.  See generally Govan, supra  note 19, at 155-167.  For example, in his 
veto message to Congress, President Bush concluded that the net result of the 1990 Act 
would be to “introduce the destructive force of quotas into our Nation's employment system” 
and to “create powerful incentives for employers to adopt hiring and promotion quotas.”  136 
CONG. REC. §16457-02 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1990).  See also  Zachary D. Fasman, Practical 
Problems of the Civil Rights Act, WASH. POST, July 23, 1990, at A11 (criticizing the 1990 Act 
as leading to quotas, increased litigation, and skyrocketing expenses related to discrimination 
claims). 
22 See generally Statement of President George Bush Upon Signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1701 (Nov. 25, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 768-69. 
23 Maj. Charles B. Hernicz, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: From Conciliation to Litigation--
How Congress Delegates Lawmaking to the Courts, 141 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (“The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 was an election-year political compromise between a beleaguered 
Republican White House and a Democratically controlled Congress.”).  “Compromise, 
however, . . . is often an ineffective solution.”  Lilling, supra  note 15, at 256. 
24 See, e.g., Douglas M. Staudmeister, Grasping the Intangible: A Guide to Assessing 
Nonpecuniary Damages in the EEOC Administrative Process, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 189, 203 
(1996). 
25 Victims of disparate impact discrimination may not recover under the compensatory 
damage provisions.  42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (1999).  For a discussion of disparate impact 
discrimination, see supra  note 16. 
26 42 U.S.C.§ 1981a(a)(1) (1999).  The damages provision provides, in pertinent part, “provided 
that the complaining party cannot recover under Section 1981 of this title, the comp laining 
party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this 
section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
5
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compensatory and punitive damages are capped according to the size of the employer.27 
 The 1991 CRA also provides that a complainant seeking compensatory (or punitive) 
damages may request a jury trial, and that, during the trial, the judge must not instruct 
the jury on the caps on damages.28 
 
B.  Enforcing Title VII in the Federal Sector 
 
Federal employees29 are required to enforce their rights under Title VII via the 
Merit Systems Protection Board30 or the EEOC.31  A federal employee must first 
                                                                                                                         
from the respondent.”  42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (1999). 
27 The 1991 CRA caps damages as follows:  
The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this  
 section . . . and the amount of punitive damages . . .  shall not exceed  
for each complaining party— 
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 and  
fewer than 101 employees in each of 20 or more calendar  
weeks in the current or preceding year, $50,000; 
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and  
fewer than 201 employees . . . , $100,000; and 
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and 
 fewer than 501 employees . . . , $200,000; and 
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500  
employees,. . . , $300,000.   
42 U.S.C. §1981a(b)(3) (1999). 
28 The 1991 CRA jury trial provision provides: 
If a complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive damages under this 
section—(1) any party may demand a trial by jury; and (2) the court shall 
not inform the jury of the limitation described in subsection (b)(3) of this 
section. 
42 U.S.C. §1981a(c) (1999). 
29 The United States government is the largest employer in the United States, employing 2.5% 
of the nation's civilian workforce, which is over 2.98 million people.  Dennis V. Damp, 
Introduction to Government Service (visited 1-12-00), 
<http://www.iccweb.com/federal/intro.htm>.  Almost 75% of all federal health care workers are 
employed by the Department of Veterans Affairs.  Id.  The following federal employees are 
covered by Title VII: those in competitive service positions (including those in positions in 
the legislative and judicial branches); employees of executive agencies (as defined in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 105); employees of the United States Postal Service; civilian employees of military 
departments (as defined in 5 U.S.C. §102); and employees of the Library of Congress.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (1999). 
30 The Merit Systems Protection Board was created by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (5 
U.S.C. § 7171 et seq.) and has coexisting authority to enforce statutes in some circumstances 
and to issue its own set of regulations, which are codified at 5 C.F.R. §1201.  MODJESKA, supra 
note 9, at § 9.02. 
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address his complaints within the agency for which he works.32  The agency must then 
investigate the claim33 and provide the employee with the results of the investigation.34  
At the end of the investigation, the agency may offer the employee a settlement offer, 
typically referred to as an “offer for full relief.”35  If the employee rejects this offer, the 
agency must dismiss the complaint.36   
 
At that point, the employee may either appeal to the EEOC, or she may file a 
claim in federal district court.37  If the employee chooses the EEOC appeal, the Office 
of Federal Operations, on behalf of the EEOC, must issue a written decision.38  If the 
                                                                                                                         
31 MODJESKA, supra  note 9, at § 9.02.  EEOC regulations regarding the federal sector 
enforcement process are codified at Federal Sector Equal Opportunity, 29 C.F.R. §1614 (1998). 
 In July of 1999, the EEOC issued a series of new regulations relating to the federal sector, the 
purpose of which was to improve the federal sector program.  See Questions and Answers: 
Final Federal Sector Complaint Processing Regulations 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (last modified 
July 12, 1999) <http://www.eeoc.gov/federal/1614-qanda.html>.  These changes include the 
expansion of deadlines, the elimination of provisions allowing agencies to revise 
administrative judges' decisions, and the elimination of provisions allowing agencies to 
dismiss complaints if an employee fails to accept the agency's offer relief.  Id.  These 
provisions went into effect on November 12, 1999.  Id.  The procedures described supra notes 
29-30, infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text reflect the procedures that were in place prior 
to November 12, 1999.  
32 29 C.F.R. §1614.105 (1999). 
33 29 C.F.R. §1614.108(a) (1999). 
34 29 C.F.R. §1614.108(f) (1999). 
35 29 C.F.R. §1614.501(a) (1999).  Full relief includes, but is not limited to, a new job placement 
with back pay and interest, discontinuation of any discriminatory practices, and an 
opportunity to participate in employee benefits denied because of discrimination.  29 C.F.R. 
§1614.501(a), (c) (1999).  The Supreme Court defined “full relief” as relief that would have been 
available to a party if he/she had prevailed on every issue in the complaint.  Jackson v. United 
States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062, XII-185 (1992).  After the 1991 
CRA, these remedies expanded to include compensatory damages, provided that the 
employee meet certain evidentiary burdens.  See, e.g., id.  For a detailed discussion of 
Jackson, see infra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.     
36 29 C.F.R. §1614.107(h) (1999).  If the agency does not offer relief, the employee may request 
a hearing before an EEOC administrative judge, or receive a final agency decision.  29 C.F.R. 
§1614.108(f) (1999).  If the employee opts for a hearing before an administrative judge (AJ), 
the AJ must conduct a hearing and issue findings of fact and conclusions of law, including 
appropriate relief if discrimination exists.  29 C.F.R. §1614.109(g) (1999).  The employing 
agency then has 60 days to reject or modify those findings and issue its own final decision.  
Id.   
37 29 C.F.R. §1614.401(a) (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1999).  
38 29 C.F.R. §1614.405 (1999).  If this decision includes a finding of discrimination, it must also 
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employee remains dissatisfied, he may appeal the EEOC decision in federal court.39  
However, regardless of when an employee decides to invoke the powers of the federal 
courts, he must always have exhausted his administrative remedies before doing so.40 
 
C.  Disagreement in the Circuits 
 
Prior to West v. Gibson, two federal cases addressed the issue of whether the 
EEOC may award compensatory damages in the administrative process: Fitzgerald v. 
Secretary, Dept. of Veterans Affairs41 and Crawford v. Babbitt.42  These two cases 
reached opposite results, yet both courts based their opinions on the language of both 
Title VII and the damages provisions of the 1991 CRA. 43  
 
In Fitzgerald, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit construed this language 
broadly, considering Congress' intent and the purpose of both statutes, and hinging its 
analysis on the provision of Title VII that allows the EEOC to have broad power to 
fashion appropriate remedies that are not limited to backpay and reinstatement.44  The 
Fitzgerald court also pointed out that allowing the EEOC to award compensatory 
damages is consistent with EEOC precedent and procedures, which deserve a great deal 
of deference.45 
 
However in Crawford, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit analyzed 
                                                                                                                         
include appropriate remedies.  Id. In addition, the employing agency may not appeal an EEOC 
decision to federal court, thus making the EEOC decision binding on the employing agency. 
29 C.F.R. §1614.504 (1999). 
39 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408 (1999); see also  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1999). 
40 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992).  In McCarthy, the Court explored the 
purposes and policies of the exhaustion requirement: “[e]xhaustion is required because it 
serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency authority and promoting 
judicial efficiency.”  Id. at 145.  Protecting agency authority is “grounded in deference to 
Congress' delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that agencies, not 
the courts, ought to have primary responsibility for the programs that Congress has charged 
them to administer.” Id.  
41 121 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 1997). 
42 148 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998).  
43 Fitzgerald v. Secretary, U.S. Dept of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d at 203, 207 (5th Cir. 1997); 
Crawford v. Babbitt, 148 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 1998). 
44 Fitzgerald, 121 F. 3d at 207 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) and stating that “[g]iven that the 
purpose of Title VII is to make injured claimants whole . . . , we do not believe that Congress 
would have created an administrative process capable of providing only partial relief.”).  
45 Id. at 207-208 (“We afford considerable weight and deference to an agency's interpretation 
of a statute it administers if Congress has not spoken directly to the precise question at 
issue.”) 
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the relationship between the language of the statutes and sovereign immunity, focusing 
primarily on the requirements for waiving sovereign immunity.46  In construing the 
statutory language narrowly, the court determined that the jury trial provision of the 
1991 CRA places a necessary condition on awarding discriminatees compensatory 
damages against a federal agency: “the agency may not be held liable for compensatory 
damages unless it has the opportunity to have a jury trial on the issue of its liability for 
those compensatory damages.”47  Since the EEOC’s administrative process prevents an 
agency from obtaining a jury trial--the only way for a complainant to receive 
compensatory damages--the EEOC may not award such damages in that process.48  
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in West v. Gibson to resolve the conflict between 
Fitzgerald and Crawford.49 
 
III.  STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
A.  Statement of Facts 
 
Michael Gibson began his civilian career with the federal government in 1988, 
when he took a position as a GS-9 accountant50 with the Department of Veterans 
                                                 
46 Crawford , 148 F.3d at 1323-24.  The Crawford  court states the “rules” for waiving 
sovereign immunity: 1. the government's consent to be sued must be express, not implied; 
and 2. the scope of this consent must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign.  Id. at 
1324 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) and Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 
(1996)).   The dissenting Supreme Court justices in West v. Gibson also base their opinion on 
the issue of sovereign immunity.  119 S. Ct. 1906, 1913-15.  See infra notes 90-94 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the dissenting opinion. 
47 Crawford , 148 F.3d at 1324.  The court's line of reasoning is as follows: it first recognizes 
that the 1972 amendments to Title VII, which extended the Act to federal government 
employees, amounted to the government's waiver of its sovereign immunity in the 
employment discrimination context.  Id.  The court then states that the Civil Rights Act of 
1991 is an expansion of this waiver because it allows compensatory damage awards against 
the government.  Id.  Thus, the jury trial provision must be read as a necessary limitation on 
the expansion of the government's waiver of its sovereign immunity in the Title VII context.  
Id. 
48 Id.  The Crawford  court also states that unless Congress provides otherwise, a waiver of 
sovereign immunity may not be extended to make federal agencies liable for compensatory 
damages as a result of the administrative process.  Crawford , 148 F.3d at 1324-25.  
Interestingly, the court cites the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Gibson v. 
Brown for this proposition.  Id.  See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of this decision. 
49 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999).  See infra  notes 76-94 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Supreme Court opinion in West v. Gibson. 
50 "GS-9" denotes Gibson's General Schedule pay rate, which is a pay scale used for all white-
9
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Affairs (VA)51 in Albuquerque, New Mexico.52  In 1990, Gibson transferred to the VA 
supply depot in Hines, Illinois, where the events giving rise to his cause of action took 
place.53  In 1992, Gibson applied for a promotion to the position of Supervisory 
Accountant, which was a GS-11/12 position.54  However, his two female supervisors 
turned him down, opting instead to hire another female.55  According to Gibson, the job 
posting was “reissued and given to an employee who did not qualify” for it.56  
 
B.  Procedural History 
 
Gibson filed a timely complaint with the VA, alleging gender discrimination and 
                                                                                                                         
collar federal employees.  Dennis V. Damp, supra  note 29.  General Schedule pay starts at GS-
1, which is a pay rate of $13,362 annually, and goes up to GS-15, which is $97,201 annually.  
Government Employment: Pay and Benefits, (last modified Dec. 30, 1999) 
<http://www.federaljobs.net/overview.htm#PAY & BENEFITS>.  These pay rates are adjusted 
for areas that have a higher cost of living.  Id.  Each pay grade has ten steps therein, which 
represent increases in pay and which federal employees earn based on performance and time 
in service.  Id.  For 2000, GS-9 pay starts at $32,380 per year; GS-11 starts at $39,178 per year; 
and GS-12 starts at $46,955 per year.  General Schedule Pay (visited Jan. 12, 2000) 
<http://www.usajobs.opm.gov/b5a.htm>.  The federal government also uses Qualification 
Standards, which work in conjunction with the General Schedule pay system, to determine 
what jobs fit applicants' skills, and based on those skills, the appropriate starting pay grade 
for that applicant.  Qualification Standards: Federal Occupations (GS-0000 through 2199) 
(last modified Dec. 30, 1999) <http://www.federaljobs.net/quals2.htm#INDEX>.  Pay grades 
are based on education and experience related to the job; for example, an applicant seeking a 
position in the GS 007 series, which is the Correctional Officer series, must have a bachelor's 
degree to qualify for a GS-4 position.  Id. 
51 The Department of Veterans Affairs was established on March 15, 1989, and became the 
fourteenth department in the President's cabinet.  Department of Veterans Affairs (VA): 
Overview (visited Jan. 12, 2000) <http://www.va.gov/organization/vavdva.htm>.  The 
Department of Veterans Affairs replaced the Veterans Administration, which was created in 
1930.  Id. The agency's mission is to provide benefits and services to veterans and their 
dependents.  Id.   
52 Gibson v. Brown, 137 F.3d 992, 993 (7th Cir. 1998), vacated sub nom. West v. Gibson, 527 
U.S. 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999). 
53 Id. 
54 Gibson v. Brown, 1996 WL 568780 at *1, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 1996), rev'd, 137 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 
1998), vacated sub nom. West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 119 S. Ct. 1906 (1999).  GS-11/12 pay is 
discussed supra  note 50. 
55 Gibson, 137 F.3d at 993. 
56 Gibson, 1996 WL 568780 at *1.  Gibson alleged that his two female supervisors passed him 
over, in favor of another woman who had far less experience than did Gibson.  Respondent's 
Brief, 1999 WL 167061, at *2 (U.S. Resp. Brief Mar. 25, 1999). 
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asking for relief in the form of backpay57 and a transfer to a different hospital of his 
choice.58  The  VA investigated the complaint59 and found no discrimination.60  Gibson 
appealed to the EEOC, which reversed the VA decision and found discrimination based 
on Gibson's gender.61  On November 6, 1995, the EEOC ordered the VA to promote 
Gibson to the Supervisory Accountant position within 30 days and to pay him backpay 
and interest within 60 days after the EEOC’s decision became final.62  The VA did not 
promote Gibson until December 23, 1995, which exceeded the 30-day requirement.63  
In addition, the VA did not pay Gibson his backpay until February 22nd and 24th of 
1996.64   
 
In the meantime, Gibson filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois,65  seeking enforcement of the EEOC’s decision with which the VA had not 
yet complied.66  Gibson added additional remedies to his complaint: front pay,67 a 
declaration of his right to transfer to another facility, a jury trial as to compensatory 
                                                 
57 Backpay for government employees is computed “for the period covered by the corrective 
action” and includes “the pay, allowances, and differentials the employee would have 
received if the unjustified or unwarranted personnel action had not occurred.” 5 C.F.R. § 
550.805(a) (1999). 
58 Gibson, 1996 WL 568780 at *1.  Gibson asked for backpay at a GS-11 rate, which is the rate 
he would have made had he received the promotion.  Id.  GS-11 pay is described supra, note 
50. 
59 See supra  notes 29-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the process federal 
employees must follow to pursue a discrimination claim against a government agency.  The 
VA made this finding in July of 1993, approximately one year after Gibson filed his initial 
complaint.  Gibson, 137 F.3d at 993. 
60 Id.  
61 Id.  This finding was made on October 6, 1995, a full two years after Gibson filed the initial 
complaint with the VA.  Gibson, 1996 WL 568780 at *1.  
62 Id.   
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Gibson filed his suit on January 11, 1996, which is after he received the promotion, but 
before the VA paid him his backpay award.  Id.  
66 Gibson, 137 F.3d at 994. 
67 Front pay is an equitable remedy designed to compensate a complainant for lost future 
wages and benefits, and is generally appropriate when reinstatement is not feasible.  Edward 
T. Ellis & Paula Zimmerman, Current Developments in Employment Law: Retaliation Claims, 
SE05 ALI-ABA 295, 312-13 (1999).  See also  Alan R. Kabat & Debra S. Katz, Racial and 
Sexual Harassment Employment Law, SE05 ALI-ABA 547, 617-18 (1999).    
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damages, and attorney fees incurred after October 6, 1995.68  While the suit was 
pending, the VA voluntarily complied with the EEOC's initial order, leaving Gibson's 
claim for compensatory damages as the only remaining issue in the case.69 
 
On the issue of compensatory damages, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the VA on the theory that Gibson raised new claims in his 
complaint, meaning that he did not exhaust administrative remedies70 with respect to 
these claims, and thus could not bring them in federal court.71  The Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit reversed the District Court, first concluding that Gibson's claim 
for compensatory damages was not a new claim, but rather a claim for damages arising 
from the initial claim against the VA. 72 The Court of Appeals then considered whether 
Gibson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, focusing on whether the EEOC 
has the power to award compensatory damages, since a complainant cannot exhaust 
agency remedies if the agency does not have the power to award the relief requested.73 
 The Court of Appeals, ruling in favor of Gibson, concluded that the EEOC does not 
have the power to award compensatory damages in the administrative process, thus 
entitling Gibson to pursue those remedies in federal court.74  The VA appealed the 
                                                 
68 Gibson, 1996 WL 568780, at *1. 42 U.S.C. §1988 allows prevailing civil rights complainants 
to collect attorney fees: “In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 
1981a, . . . [and] Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . the court, in its discretion, may 
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of 
the costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §1988(b) (1995).  The prevailing party, at the court's discretion, may 
also collect expert fees as part of the attorney fee.  Id. §1988(c). 
69 Gibson, 137 F.3d at 994.   
70 Generally, a failure to exhaust administrative remedies precludes a complainant from 
pursuing a claim in federal court.  Gibson, 137 F.3d at 995.  The exhaustion doctrine is 
discussed supra  note 40.  See supra  notes 29-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
the EEOC process for federal employees. 
71 Gibson, 1996 WL 568780, at *4.  The District Court essentially ruled on the pleadings since 
the VA filed a motion to dismiss Gibson's complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a 
claim for relief. Id. at *1.  The District Court granted the VA's motion on the grounds of 
jurisdiction, rejecting Gibson's claims that federal jurisdiction was proper either under the 
Federal Tort Claims Act or under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1346.  Id. at *3.  However, the District 
Court decided it could consider Gibson's substantive claims based on jurisdiction under §717 
of Title VII.  Id.  The District Court also granted the VA's motion as to Gibson's claims for 
front pay and a transfer, but granted summary judgment in favor of Gibson on the issue of 
attorney fees, since he would never have incurred those fees had the VA responded promptly 
to the EEOC's initial order. Id. at *6-*7.  
72 Gibson, 137 F.3d at 994. 
73 Id. at 994-95 (citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 148 (1992)). 
74 Id. at 998.  The Court of Appeals analysis focuses on the language of §1981a and how this 
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decision to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve the 
issue of whether the EEOC has the power to award compensatory damages.75 
 
C.  U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
 
1.  Majority Reasoning 
 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision written by Justice Breyer, vacated the 
Seventh Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to decide 
whether Gibson actually notified the EEOC that he was seeking compensatory 
damages.76   In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the legislative history of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, citing the purposes of those amendments and their 
relationship to the enforcement of Title VII.77  The Court found that the legislative 
history, combined with the language and purposes of the Act, is consistent with a grant 
of authority to the EEOC to award compensatory damages.78  In parsing the language 
                                                                                                                         
language is too ambiguous to allow the EEOC to award compensatory damages.  See id. at 
996-98.  For instance, the Court of Appeals discussed the jury trial provisions in §1981a(c) 
and the use of the word “action” (as opposed to “proceeding”) in §1981a(a)(1) to 
demonstrate Congress' lack of intent to extend such broad powers to the EEOC. Id. at 996-97.  
The Court's strict construction is based on notions of sovereign immunity and Congress' 
ability to legislate suits for money damages against the federal government.  Id. at 997.  See 
infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text for more discussion of sovereign immunity, as raised 
by the dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court opinion. 
75 West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. 863 (1999) (granting certiorari to hear the case); see also West v. 
Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1909 (stating the issue of the case). 
76 West v. Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1912-13.  The Government's petition for certiorari did not 
include the factual issue of whether Gibson did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies, 
which precluded the Supreme Court from considering that issue.  Id.  In his brief, Gibson 
argues that the Supreme Court should affirm the Court of Appeals decision on the alternate 
grounds that Gibson did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies: “Mike Gibson 
exercised his rights, followed all the rules, complied fully with EEOC rules, 
regulations, and instructions. After receiving less than full relief, Gibson properly 
pursued his claim in federal court.  The EEOC cannot now argue that Gibson failed to 
use magic words and is barred from filing suit in federal court.”  Respondent's Brief, 
1999 WL 167061, at *30, West v. Gibson (No. 98-238).  The Government responds to 
this argument in its reply brief, contending that the factual issue of Gibson's 
exhaustion is not properly before the Supreme Court because it is not part of the issue 
on which the Court granted certiorari.  Petitioner's Reply Brief, 1999 WL 203478, at 
*13, West v. Gibson (No. 98-238). 
77 119 S. Ct. at 1908-09.  
78 Id. at 1910-12. 
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of the Act, the majority focused first on section 717(b) of Title VII,79 which allows the 
EEOC to enforce the provisions of Title VII “through appropriate remedies, including 
reinstatement . . . with or without backpay.”80  The Court reasoned that the 
“appropriate remedies” language preceding the enumeration of specific remedies 
indicates that the EEOC's authority is not limited to equitable remedies.81 
 
The majority also addressed Gibson's argument that the use of the word 
“action” in the context of when compensatory damages may be awarded should be 
construed narrowly to contemplate only judicial cases, not administrative proceedings.82 
 The Court counters this argument by pointing out that Congress could have used other 
devices to preclude the EEOC from awarding compensatory damages.83  The majority 
then dismissed this argument by concluding that, in light of the purposes and history of 
Title VII, the simple use of the word “action” could not possibly be construed to deny 
the EEOC’s authority to award damages.84  In this same vein, the majority dismisses 
Gibson's argument based on the jury trial provision in the 1991 CRA. 85  
                                                 
79 Section 717(b) is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b).   
80 119 S. Ct. at 1910 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)).  
81 Id.  The Court supported this premise by stating that the purpose of Title VII's remedial 
scheme, to remedy discrimination in federal employment, would be undermined if the EEOC 
could not award federal employees the full panoply of remedies available under the statute.  
Id.  The Court also posited that withholding this authority from the EEOC would create an 
awkward and expensive system in which federal employees would have to go to federal court 
to be fully compensated.  Id. 
82 Id. at 1911. The statutory provision in question here provides that:  
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . against a respondent who engaged in 
unlawful intentional discrimination (not . . . disparate impact) . . . may 
recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) 
of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent. 
42 U.S.C. §1981a(a)(1) (1999) (emphasis added).   
83 See Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1911.  The Court reasons that, if Congress intended to prevent the 
EEOC from awarding compensatory damages, it could have drafted §1981a(a)(1) in such a way 
as to restrict its application to exclude the provisions regarding federal sector employment 
discrimination claims.  Id.  
84 Id.  But see New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60-62 (1980)(concluding 
that "action" refers to "court actions," and "proceedings" refers generally to state, 
local, or administrative charges.).  Gibson uses Carey to argue that the ordinary meaning 
of the words “action” and “proceeding” in the context of the statutes indicates that 
Congress authorized compensatory damage awards in civi l actions, not in 
administrative proceedings.  See Respondent's Brief, 1999 WL 167061, at *13 and n.1, 
West v. Gibson (No. 98-238). 
85 Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1912.  The jury trial provision is codified in 42 U.S.C. §1981a(c) (1999).  
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Gibson's final argument centers on a point that is the focus of the dissenting 
opinion:86 waiver of the Government's sovereign immunity.87  Gibson argues that 
requiring the government to pay compensatory damage awards waives the 
government's sovereign immunity, thereby requiring a narrow construction of Title 
VII's damages provisions.88  The majority disagrees with this argument, concluding that 
the government's waiver of its sovereign immunity is adequately expressed in the 
“statutory language, taken together with statutory purposes, history and the absence of 
any convincing reason for denying the EEOC the relevant power.”89 
 
2.  Dissent Reasoning 
 
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Kennedy, objects to the majority's 
analysis of the sovereign immunity issue, and thus would construe the compensatory 
damages provisions narrowly to preclude the EEOC from awarding these damages in 
the administrative process.90  The dissent reasons that a narrow construction of the 
Title VII damages provisions is necessary in light of the requirement for clear and 
unambiguous language in order for a statute to waive the government's sovereign 
immunity from suits for money damages.91  With this requirement in mind, the dissent 
                                                                                                                         
See supra  note 28 for the pertinent language of this provision.  Gibson's argument tracks the 
Court of Appeals decision, supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text, by citing the jury trial 
provision as a necessary limitation on the government's waiver of sovereign immunity.  
Respondent's Brief, 1999 WL 167061, at *16-*17, West v. Gibson (No. 98-238).  Gibson 
contends that, by enacting the jury trial provision, “Congress clearly and unambiguously 
limited its waiver of immunity from such awards to civil actions in federal district court.” 
 Id. at *17.   
86 The dissenting opinion is discussed infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.  
87 Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1912. 
88 Id.  See supra  notes 46-48 and accompanying text for the sovereign immunity argument the 
Court of Appeals made in Crawford v. Babbitt. 
89 Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1912.  In this portion of the opinion, Justice Breyer distinguishes 
between the questions of waiver with respect to compensatory damage awards in general, 
and of the administration of those awards in light of the waiver.  See id.  Justice Breyer 
declines to resolve the issue of whether the strict standards that apply to governmental 
waiver (i.e., strict construction and unequivocal language, discussed infra note 91) apply to 
the administration question.  See id.  According to Justice Breyer, even if the stricter standard 
applies, it is met here by virtue of the language, purposes, and history of the statute.  Id. 
90 See id. at 1913-15 (Kennedy, J. dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, 
and Justice Thomas). 
91 Id. at 1913.  The dissent cites to Department of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 119 
S. Ct. 687 (1999), to support its sovereign immunity argument.  Id.  Generally, a waiver of 
sovereign immunity must be expressed unequivocally in a given statute, and cannot be 
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refutes the majority's analysis of the language of the statute, concluding that it does not 
clearly and unequivocally grant the EEOC authority to award compensatory damages.92 
 The dissent also rejects the majority's reliance on the legislative history and other 
“extra-textual sources” as being misplaced, as this reliance contradicts long-held 
precedent requiring the courts to look only to the text of a statute to find a waiver of 
sovereign immunity.93  Lastly, the dissent cites the policy behind sovereign immunity--
to protect the “public fisc”--and reasons that it is not at all clear that empowering one 
government agency to award government funds to fellow employees in another agency 
would serve that purpose.94 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
By holding that the EEOC can indeed award compensatory damages as part of 
the administrative process, the Supreme Court ratifies the EEOC's already existing 
paradigm for assessing and awarding such damages.95  The problem with the Court's 
decision is that it essentially endorses an administrative scheme that is fraught with 
contradictions and difficulties for Title VII complainants.96  The 1991 CRA itself also 
poses difficulties for complainants seeking full compensation for injuries resulting from 
intentional discriminatory conduct.  By virtue of congressional compromise,97 the 
amount of damages any one complainant may receive is capped according to the size of 
                                                                                                                         
implied from the language therein.  Id. at 691.  If a statute does indeed contain a waiver, the 
scope of the waiver must be narrowly construed in favor of the sovereign.  Id. 
92 Gibson, 119 S. Ct. at 1915.  The dissent contests the majority's construction of “appropriate 
remedies,” reasoning that it is not obvious that this phrase should be read as expansively as 
the majority posits.  See id. at 1913.  The dissent also makes much of the fact that §1981a does 
not specifically refer to the EEOC, “much less empower it to award or authorize money 
damages.”  Id. at 1914.   
93 Id. at 1915. 
94 Id. at 1914-15.   
95 See infra  notes 101-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the EEOC precedents 
that shape this paradigm.  The majority opinion in Gibson mentions the EEOC scheme briefly 
in a discussion of the 1991 CRA: “[o]nce the [Act] became law, the EEOC began to grant 
compensatory damages awards in Federal Government employment discrimination cases.” 
Gibson, 119 S.Ct. at 1909.  To support this proposition, the majority cites to Jackson v. United 
States Postal Serv., E.E.O.C. App. No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062 (1992), which is the seminal 
case in tracking EEOC policy and procedure.  Id.  Jackson is discussed more in depth infra 
note 101-104 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 114-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with the 
EEOC system. 
97 See supra  notes 14-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the background of the 
1991 CRA. 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 33 [2000], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol33/iss3/4
2000] WEST V. GIBSON 
 
her employer.98  Thus, the Supreme Court's decision in West v. Gibson does little more 
than highlight the limitations and deficiencies inherent in both the 1991 CRA itself and in 
 the EEOC system for processing federal sector discrimination complaints.99 
 
A.  The EEOC Scheme for Addressing Compensatory Damage Claims 
 
The EEOC defines compensatory damages as including “damages for past 
pecuniary loss (out-of-pocket loss), future pecuniary loss, and nonpecuniary loss 
(emotional harm).”100  In Jackson v. United States Postal Service,101 the EEOC held for 
the first time that compensatory damages were available in the administrative 
process.102  The EEOC held that, since the complainant had asked for medical expenses 
in his initial complaint, the Postal Service should have addressed that claim by requiring 
objective evidence103 to show first that the he incurred compensatory damages, and 
                                                 
98 See infra notes 125-130 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory caps. 
99 The EEOC process for federal employees is discussed supra notes 29-40 and 
accompanying text.  For a critical analysis of value of the EEOC in addressing employment 
discrimination claims, see Michael Selmi, supra note 2.  Selmi posits that the passage of the 
1991 CRA makes the EEOC ripe for reassessment because the amendments “make 
employment discrimination cases more attractive to private attorneys.”  Id. at 3.  Selmi 
concludes that the agency is generally a failure and should either be eliminated or 
substantially reformed.  See id. at 57-64. 
100 EEOC Decision No. 915.002, Enforcement Guidance: Compensatory and Punitive 
Damages Available under § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1992 WL 189089 at *4 
(E.E.O.C. July 14, 1992).  Examples of pecuniary loss are medical expenses, including 
psychiatric expenses, moving expenses, and job search expenses.  Id.  Future pecuniary 
losses are those losses that are likely to occur after the conclusion of the litigation.  Id.  In 
contrast, nonpecuniary loss includes a host of intangible, but compensable, injuries such as 
pain and suffering, inconvenience, injury to professional standing, injury to character, and 
loss of enjoyment of life.  Id. at *5. 
101 E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 01923399, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062 (1992).  In this case, a Postal Service 
employee filed a complaint alleging discrimination based on sex, race, age, physical handicap, 
and reprisal.  Id. at XII-185.  The agency offered Mr. Jackson an offer of full relief, which did 
not address the medical expenses he incurred as a result of these events.  Id.  The agency 
then canceled Mr. Jackson's complaint for failure to accept the offer; Mr. Jackson appealed 
the agency's decision to the EEOC.  Id. 
102 Id. at XII-186.  The EEOC analyzed the language of the 1991 CRA and concluded that both 
the language and the purpose of the Act indicate that such damages are clearly available in 
the administrative process.  Id. at XII 186-87.  
103 The EEOC evidently adopted the “objective evidence” standard in this case because 
Jackson asked for reimbursement of medical expenses; he did not claim any nonpecuniary 
loss that is more difficult to assess because of the intangible nature of such loss.  
Staudmeister, supra  note 24, at 208. 
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second that those damages were causally linked to the discrimination.104   
 
EEOC cases after Jackson modified and refined agency standards for 
addressing both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses.  In Carle v. Department of the 
Navy,105 the EEOC faced a claim for emotional distress, which could not be readily 
proved by “objective evidence.”106  Although the Jackson two-part inquiry still applied, 
the EEOC addressed the intangible nature of the emotional distress claim by requiring 
agencies to consider objective and “other evidence” to evaluate a damages claim.107  
After establishing the types of evidence that are appropriate, the EEOC dealt with issues 
relating to burden of proof and determining the reasonableness of a nonpecuniary 
damage award.  Once a complainant makes a prima facie showing of damages,108 the 
burden shifts to the agency to refute the claim.109  However, even if a complainant 
makes the minimum showing, the actual award must be limited to the sum necessary to 
reimburse her for actual losses, whether tangible or not, caused by the discriminatory 
conduct.110  Generally, a compensatory damage award is proper if it is not 
“monstrously excessive standing alone,” and if it is “consistent with similar awards 
made in similar cases.”111  To determine consistency with other cases, the EEOC looks 
                                                 
104 Jackson, 93 F.E.O.R. 3062 at XII-185.  The EEOC vacated the agency's dismissal and 
remanded the case for further processing.  Id. at XII-187. 
105 E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 01922369, 94 F.E.O.R. 1043 (1993). 
106 Objective evidence includes receipts and bills from visits to the doctor, transportation to 
the hospital, etc.  Carle, 93 F.E.O.R. at XI-50.    
107 Id. “Other evidence,” as contrasted with objective evidence, could include “a statement 
by appellant describing her emotional distress, and statements from witnesses, both on and 
off the job, describing the distress.” Id.   
108 Making a prima facie showing of damages involves alleging damages in the complaint, 
demonstrating the link between the alleged discrimination and those damages, and submitting 
evidence relating to the damages.  See Mims v. Department of the Navy, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 
01933956, 94 F.E.O.R. 3153 (1993).  In Mims, the complainant asked for $300,000 for pain and 
suffering and, upon the agency's request, submitted medical documentation relating to her 
hospitalization.  Id. at XII-19.  The agency's offer of full relief awarded complainant $500 with 
no substantiation or justification for this figure.  Id. 
109 Id. at XII-20.  Generally, to avoid reversal under this standard, the agency must set forth 
the specific grounds on which it determines the amount of a compensatory damages award; it 
is not enough for the agency to reject claims without substantiation.  Staudmeister, supra  
note 24, at 210. 
110 Rountree v. Dept. of Agric., 1995 WL 413533, at *7 (E.E.O.C. July 7, 1995).  In this case, the 
complainant asked for a total of $937,725 in compensatory damages for a host of pecuniary 
and nonpecuniary losses relating to a poor job performance review.  Id. at *2-*5.  The agency 
decision found discrimination, but denied complainant's request for damages based on a lack 
of causation.  Id. at *5. 
111 Carpenter v. Dept. of Agric., 1995 WL 434072, at *9 (E.E.O.C. July 17, 1995) quoting 
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to federal cases involving either bench or jury trials to determine a range of dollar values 
that other courts have awarded for the type of damages alleged.112  The EEOC then 
considers the nature and severity of the complainant's harm, as well as the duration or 
the anticipated duration of this harm, to award a reasonable dollar value within the 
determined range.113   
 
B.  How the EEOC System May Preclude Actual or Adequate Recovery of 
Compensatory Damages 
 
1.  Procedural and Evidentiary Difficulties 
 
The EEOC process is a very complicated one for an average discrimination 
complainant, since these complainants often negotiate the system without counsel.114  
For example, the EEOC has placed limitations on when a complainant may ask for 
compensatory damages, how a complainant must ask for these damages, and what sort 
of evidence a complainant must adduce to prove these damages.115  These limitations 
may thwart pro se complainants and may even preclude them from recovering at all, or 
at least from recovering compensatory damages.116 
                                                                                                                         
Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th Cir. 1989).  In this case, the EEOC held that 
awarding the complainant half of the amount he had asked for “properly compensates 
[complainant] for his emotional distress damages, based on the long pattern of agency 
actions that resulted in causing [complainant] further harm, and that such an award is not 
excessive standing alone.” Id.  
112 E.g., Rountree, 1995 WL 413533, at *9.  The EEOC reversed the agency in part, finding that 
some of complainant’s injuries were indeed caused by the agency's conduct.  Id. at *7.  In 
deciding to award the complainant in this case damages for his emotional distress, the EEOC 
examined recent court and jury awards to arrive at a range of $500 to $100,000.  Id.  
113 Id. at *9. After determining the $500 to $100,000 range, the EEOC decided, without any real 
explanation, that an award of $8,000 in compensatory damages would be reasonable for this 
particular complainant.  See id. at *10.  
114 Interestingly, this issue was addressed at oral argument:  
QUESTION: Is it true that most of these people at the agency level 
are not represented by counsel? 
  MS. McDOWELL: I believe that's correct, Your Honor, at least a 
large number of them are not. 
Oral Argument of Barbara B. McDowell, Esq., on Behalf of the Petitioner, 1999 WL 
270048, at *8 (U.S. Oral Arg. April 25, 1999).  See also  Selmi, supra note 2, at 43.  
115 See generally Staudmeister, supra  note 24, at 220-250. 
116 See, e.g., Roberson v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 01940467, 94 F.E.O.R. 
3325 (1994) (affirming the agency's dismissal of the complaint, and thus precluding the 
complainant from recovering any damages, because the complainant refused the agency's 
offer of full relief).   
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Generally, a complainant may raise a claim for compensatory damages at any 
point during the process up until the EEOC renders its initial decision; however, a 
complainant may not raise a compensatory damage claim in a request for the EEOC to 
reconsider its decision.117   This may thwart a pro se complainant who fails to request 
compensatory damages until that phase of the process.   
 
To assert a proper claim for compensatory damages, a complainant “need not 
use legal terms of art such as ‘compensatory damages,' but merely must use some 
words or phrases to put the agency on notice that . . . a nonpecuniary loss has been 
incurred.”118  However, the EEOC has not applied this standard consistently, which 
may confound complainants who do not have the assistance of counsel while drafting 
their complaints.119  In one case, even though the complainant did not make an 
affirmative claim for compensatory damages, the EEOC reversed the employing 
agency's adverse decision and remanded the complaint to the agency for consideration 
of compensatory damages.120  Yet in another case where there was no affirmative 
request for compensatory damages, the EEOC upheld the agency's dismissal of the 
complaint for complainant's failure to accept an offer of full relief.121 
 
Even though a complainant may raise a claim for compensatory damages on 
time and in the appropriate terms, she may not be able to adduce appropriate evidence 
to demonstrate her damages.  In some instances, it is not clear whether a complainant's 
testimony alone is enough, or whether the complainant must also present testimony 
                                                 
117 E.g., Berendsen v. Dept. of Agric., 1996 WL 106929, at *5 (E.E.O.C. March 1, 1996).  There 
is a narrow exception to this general rule whereby a new claim for compensatory damages is 
proper at this phase if the prior decision is remanded for further processing because of 
another deficiency.  Staudmeister, supra  note 24, at 229-30 and n.309 (citing Square v. Dept. of 
Veterans Affairs, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 05930910 (1994)). 
118 Fiandaca v. Dept. of the Navy, 1995 WL 577063, at *8 n.3 (E.E.O.C. Sept. 21, 1995) (internal 
citation omitted). 
119 See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text for an analysis of cases in which the EEOC 
has applied its own standards inconsistently. 
120 Fiandaca, supra  note 118, at *5.  The EEOC held that the complainant “alluded to a claim 
for compensatory damages throughout the processing of the case” because she alleged that 
she suffered mental anguish and a nervous breakdown as a result of sexual harassment.  Id. at 
*2. 
121 Roberson, 94 F.E.O.R. 3325, at XII-457.  In her complaint, the complainant alleged that she 
was hurt emotionally by derogatory comments from her supervisor.  Id.  In addressing this 
allegation, the EEOC stated that “[t]his allegation, without a specific claim for damages, is 
insufficient to put the agency on notice that a claim for compensatory damages has been 
raised.”  Id. at XII-458.  It is not clear how this claim is less sufficient to put the agency on 
notice than Ms. Fiandaca's claim, discussed supra  note 120. 
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from other witnesses and medical records.122  Although medical records can be useful 
to corroborate statements and testimony, submitting these records to the employing 
agency can be problematic.  For example, the EEOC requires that medical records not 
only cite the complainant's injuries, but also state that the agency's conduct actually 
inflicted the harm.123  Another problem with submitting  medical records is the question 
of privacy.  The EEOC has held that, since a complainant places her medical condition 
in issue by requesting damages for emotional damages and medical expenses, the 
complainant is not entitled to any privilege and the employing agency may examine 
medical records even without the complainant's consent.124 
 
2.  Statutory Caps on Damages 
 
Assuming that a pro se complainant can navigate the EEOC system 
successfully, there is still an ultimate limitation on her recovery: statutory caps on 
compensatory damages.125  These caps are the result of a compromise between 
proponents of tort reform126 and those who reject such limitations, especially in the 
context of intentional conduct.127  From the perspective of an employment 
                                                 
122 See Carpenter, 1995 WL 434072, at *4.  See also  EEOC Decision No. 915.002, supra note 
100, at *6 (“‘Plaintiff's own testimony may be solely sufficient to establish humiliation or 
mental distress.’”)(internal citation omitted).  But see id. at *8 (“A medical release should be 
obtained from the complaining party whenever emotional or physical harm is alleged.”). 
123 E.g., Browne v. Dept. of Agric., 1995 WL 434086, at *6 (E.E.O.C. July 17, 1995) (“Morever, 
we further find that the [complainant's] medical evidence did not provide the requisite proof 
of a connection between the agency's action and the [complainant's] loss of health.”). 
124 Carpenter, 1995 WL 434072, at *15 n.2.  
125 See supra  notes 14-28 and accompanying text for more background on passage of the 
1991 CRA and its damages provisions.  The damages caps provisions are cited supra note 27. 
126 In the 1980s, most states enacted legislation limiting a jury's ability to award large damage 
amounts in tort cases.  See Roskiewicz, supra  note 15, at 410.  The policy behind this 
legislation included limiting liability of potential tortfeasors, whose funds would be depleted 
by these large awards.  Id.  The most compelling counterargument to this policy is that 
statutory caps on damages allow intentional tortfeasors to use a cost-benefit analysis to 
determine how and when to act, knowing that a certain amount of egregious conduct is 
“allowed” from a cost standpoint.  Cf. id.  In Ohio, caps on the amount of punitive 
damages a jury could award have been struck down as a violation of the Ohio 
Constitution because, inter alia, these caps deprive litigants of a right to a jury trial.  
State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v.  Sheward,  715 N.E.2d 1062, 1091 
(1999).  The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that, by capping punitive damages, the 
Ohio legislature substitutes its own will for that of the jury, which essentially nullifies 
the jury's determination of an individual litigant's case and deprives that litigant of her 
right to a trial by jury.  Id.  
127 See Roskiewicz, supra  note 15, at 393.  According to Roskiewicz, “less than one week after 
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discriminatee, especially in the federal sector, these caps represent a major obstacle to a 
compensatory damage award that actually makes him whole.128  Instead, the actual 
damages any complainant may receive are limited based not on the agency's conduct, 
but rather on the size of the agency, which has no actual bearing on the degree of 
severity of the discriminatory conduct.129  The result is an administrative system in 
which complainants who suffer the most serious injuries cannot obtain full relief, and 
the most reprehensible offenders are protected from full liability.130 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
At first glance, the decision in West v. Gibson seems like a triumph for federal 
sector employment discriminatees because it arms the EEOC with a complete arsenal of 
remedies with which to combat employment discrimination in the federal sector.  
However, the decision in West v. Gibson is not at all advantageous to federal employees. 
 Just as they did before the Gibson decision, federal employment discriminatees will 
face the EEOC system largely without the assistance of counsel.  And just as before, 
actually obtaining compensatory damages in this system will be a game of chance for 
federal sector complainants because the EEOC's policies and standards remain unclear 
and inconsistent.  Instead of taking an opportunity to shake up the current system by 
allowing federal employees access to federal court to litigate compensatory damages 
claims, the Supreme Court's decision in West v. Gibson does nothing more than 
sanction the status quo, which is a treacherous and inconsistent administrative process 
based on a congressional compromise.   
 
Christina M. Royer 
                                                                                                                         
President Bush signed the 1991” CRA, senators from both parties proposed bills to lift the 
caps.  Id. at 393-94. 
128 In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Supreme Court 
recognized that one of the purposes of Title VII is to “make persons whole for injuries 
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination.”  The caps do not apply to 
monetary relief such as back pay and medical reimbursements, but they do apply to 
nonpecuniary losses such as emotional suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.  Richard T. 
Seymour, How to Stem the Erosion: A Practical Guide to Using the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
HUM. RTS., Summer 1992 at 13. 
129 See Seymour, supra note 128, at 13; see also  Roskiewicz, supra  note 15, at 408 (stating that 
“victims of sex, religious, or disability discrimination only have an opportunity to recover an 
amount based on the size of the employer rather than the egregiousness of the employer's 
conduct.”).  
130 Roskiewicz, supra  note 15, at 409, citing Senator Kennedy's statements from the 
Congressional Record, 137 CONG. REC. §18,375 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1991). 
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